


# Higher-order homophily is combinatorially impossible


Austin Benson · Cornell University  
HONS@Networks 2021



Joint work with  
Nate Veldt (Cornell → Texas A&M) &  
Jon Kleinberg (Cornell)




# People tend to connect to similar others.



age  
race  
gender  
location  
occupation  
education level  
political affiliation  
religious affiliation  
attitudes and aspirations

*Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks*, McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001.  
*Mixing Patterns in Networks*, Newman, 2003.

# Homophily is used to understand groups.




*The duality of persons and groups*, Breiger, 1974.

*Sex and race homogeneity in naturally occurring groups*, Mayhew et al., 1995.

*Testing a dynamic model of social composition*, McPherson & Rotolo, 1996.

*Community-Affiliation Graph Model for Overlapping Network Community Detection*, Yang & Leskovec, 2012. 3

# Even though homophily is used to understand groups, we measure it from pairwise interactions.



5 in 1 BG, 2 BB edges (3 total)

6 in 2 BG, 2 BB edges (4 total)

7 in 2 BG, 2 BB edges (4 total)

$$h(B) = (2 + 2 + 2) / (3 + 4 + 4) = 6/11$$

$$h(G) = (2 + 3 + 3 + 2) / (2 + 5 + 4 + 4) = 2/3$$

*affinity* aka *homophily index*

The *baseline* is the probability that a uniformly chosen neighbor is the same class.

$b(B) = 2/6 < h(B) \rightarrow h(B) / b(B) > 1 \rightarrow$  homophily w/r/t to the blue class

$b(G) = 3/6 < h(G) \rightarrow h(G) / b(G) > 1 \rightarrow$  homophily w/r/t to the green class

# We have lots of social data of group interactions.



**Communications**



**Physical proximity**




**Collaboration**

Higher-order Homophily is Combinatorially Impossible

Nate Veldt  
Center for Applied Math  
Cornell University

Austin R. Benson  
Computer Science Dept.  
Cornell University


Jon Kleinberg  
Computer Science Dept.  
Cornell University



**Social media**



# We propose a homophily metric from group interactions.



⑤ in 0 BGG, 1 BBG, 1 BBB, edges (2 total)

⑥ in 1 BGG, 1 BBG, 1 BBB edges (3 total)

⑦ In 0 BGG, 2 BBG, 1 BBB edges (3 total)

$$h_1(\mathbf{B}) = (0 + 1 + 0) / (2 + 3 + 3) = 1/8$$

$$h_2(\mathbf{B}) = (1 + 1 + 2) / (2 + 3 + 3) = 4/8$$

$$h_3(\mathbf{B}) = (1 + 1 + 1) / (2 + 3 + 3) = 3/8$$

The *t-baseline* is the probability that there are  $t$  of a given class if other 2 are random.

$$b_1(\mathbf{B}) = (4 \text{ choose } 2) / (6 \text{ choose } 2) = 2/5 > h_1(\mathbf{B}) \rightarrow h_1(\mathbf{B}) / b_1(\mathbf{B}) < 1$$

→ no *type-1* homophily w/r/t to the blue class


$$b_2(\mathbf{B}) = (2 \text{ choose } 1) * (4 \text{ choose } 1) / (6 \text{ choose } 2) = 8/15 > h_2(\mathbf{B}) \rightarrow h_2(\mathbf{B}) / b_2(\mathbf{B}) < 1$$

→ no *type-2* homophily w/r/t to the blue class

$$b_3(\mathbf{B}) = 1 / (6 \text{ choose } 2) = 1/15 < h_3(\mathbf{B}) \rightarrow h_3(\mathbf{B}) / b_3(\mathbf{B}) > 1$$


→ yes *type-3* homophily w/r/t to the blue class

# We propose a homophily metric from group interactions.



degree	1	2	3	4	$\Sigma$	5	6	7	$\Sigma$
type-1	0	1	0	1	2	0	1	0	1
type-2	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	4
type-3	1	2	2	1	6	1	1	1	3
$\Sigma$	1	3	3	3	10	2	3	3	8


$$\begin{array}{lll}
 \mathbf{h}_1(\mathbf{G}) = 0.2 & \mathbf{h}_2(\mathbf{G}) = 0.2 & \mathbf{h}_3(\mathbf{G}) = 0.6 \\
 \mathbf{b}_1(\mathbf{G}) = 0.2 & \mathbf{b}_2(\mathbf{G}) = 0.6 & \mathbf{b}_3(\mathbf{G}) = 0.2 \\
 \mathbf{h}_1(\mathbf{B}) = 0.12 & \mathbf{h}_2(\mathbf{B}) = 0.5 & \mathbf{h}_3(\mathbf{B}) = 0.38 \\
 \mathbf{b}_1(\mathbf{B}) = 0.4 & \mathbf{b}_2(\mathbf{B}) = 0.53 & \mathbf{b}_3(\mathbf{B}) = 0.07
 \end{array}$$



# Affinities also have a statistical interpretation.

Hypergraph stochastic block model for size- $k$  groups and classes **B** & **G**

- $p_t$  = prob. exactly  $t$  of class **B** in a hyperedge



- Type- $t$  node degrees are asymptotically independent
- For an observed set of degrees,  $h_t(\mathbf{B})$  is the MLE for  $p_t$

*Monophily in social networks introduces similarity among friends-of-friends*  
Altenburger & Ugander, 2018.



# Women in computer science research: what is the bibliography data telling us?



**Authors:** Swati Agarwal, Nitish Mittal, Rohan Katyal, Ashish Sureka, Denzil Correa


[Authors Info & Affiliations](#)

ACM SIGCAS Computers and Society, Volume 46, Issue 1 • 0March 2016 • pp 7–19 • <https://doi.org/10.1145/2908216.2908218>


**Published:** 28 March 2016

74,134 papers in  
81 CS conferences with  
2, 3, or 4 authors each, covering  
105,256 total authors,  
21.5% of which are female


### 2-author papers





### 3-author papers



### 4-author papers





Women are more likely to be in majority-female collaborations than by chance.  
 Men are only more likely than chance to be in all-male or 1M–3F collaborations.




**Women and men cannot both prefer majority same-gender collaborations more than chance!**

Women exhibit monotonically increasing preferences for more female authors.  
 Men don't have this pattern.

**Women and men cannot both have monotonically increasing majority-gender preferences!**

When two classes of people participate in groups of 3, they cannot both have higher than random preferences for all groups where they are in the majority.

This is not a social finding...  
it is a combinatorial impossibility of hypergraphs!




242 students at a primary school with gatherings of students if they all made contact within 20 seconds as measured by wearable sensors

# Our theory captures these ideas precisely.

In group interactions of size  $k$ , we say that class  $X$  exhibits

- *majority homophily* if  $h_t(X) > b_t(X)$  for  $t > k / 2$ ;
  - *monotonic homophily* if  $h_t(X) / b_t(X) > h_{t-1}(X) / b_{t-1}(X)$  for  $t > k / 2$ .
- [these are the same if  $k = 2$ ]





## Theorem [Veldt-Benson-Kleinberg 21]

- For  $k$  odd,  
both classes *cannot* simultaneously exhibit majority homophily or monotonic homophily.
- For  $k$  even,  
both classes *cannot* exhibit majority homophily  
if  $h_{k/2}(X) / b_{k/2}(X) > h_{k/2-1}(X) / b_{k/2-1}(X)$  for at least on class  $X$ .
- For  $k$  even,  
both classes *can* exhibit majority homophily  
but need  $h_{k/2}(X) > b_{k/2}(X)$  for at least one class  $X$ .

[these results also covers another homophily measure and many types of baselines]




**Intuition.** Majority groups for one class are minority groups for the other class.



# A weak homophily impossibility result is easy to prove.

No class can have all affinities above baselines, i.e., there cannot be a class where  $h_t(X) > b_t(X)$  for  $t = 1, 2, \dots, k$ .

**Proof.**  $h_1(X) + \dots + h_t(X) = 1 = b_1(X) + \dots + b_t(X)$ .






1,718 congresspersons, 810 / 908 republican / democrat, co-sponsoring 883,105 bills

*group size k*




		5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Rep. GHI		2	2	2	3	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	7	7	6
Dem. GHI		1	2	2	2	3	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6

Group Homophily Index (GHI) = number of top affinity scores above baseline







1,718 congresspersons, 810 / 908 republican / democrat, co-sponsoring 883,105 bills



$$\frac{[(810 \text{ choose } 5) * (908 \text{ choose } 5)]}{[(810 \text{ choose } 8) * (908 \text{ choose } 2)]} = 7.99$$









More shopping trips highly focused on clothes or groceries than expected by chance.



More common to go on a clothing-focused trip and get a few groceries than a grocery-focused trip and get a couple of clothing items.



48,480 products purchased at Walmart



8,956 hotels reviewed by  
128,494 users on  
tripadvisor.com



		<i>group size k</i>											
		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
N. America	GHI	1	<b>1</b>	1	1	1	2	2	<b>2</b>	3	3	3	4
Europe	GHI	1	<b>1</b>	1	1	1	1	1	<b>2</b>	3	3	3	3

$\Pr(2 \text{ boys}) = 1/4$   
 $\Pr(2 \text{ girl}) = 1/4$   
 $\Pr(1 \text{ boy}, 1 \text{ girl}) = 1/2$



“family portrait”  
 query on Flickr  
 → 1,051 images




Pairwise reduction  
 graph homophily  
**Male** 0.43  
**Female** 0.41



“wedding + bride + groom + portrait”  
 query on Flickr  
 → 662 images

Pairwise reduction  
 graph homophily

**Male** 0.57  
**Female** 0.54





“group shot” or  
 “group photo” or  
 “group portrait”  
 query on Flickr  
 → 963 images

Pairwise reduction  
 graph homophily

**Male** 0.60  
**Female** 0.58

# There is lots of structure when analyzing higher-order interactions where nodes are in one of two classes.



1. Homophily is (in some sense) impossible for higher-order networks.
2. This is a combinatorial fact, so social insights need care.
3. (near-)homogeneous groups are often homophilous:  
physical contacts, political teams, co-reviews, certain photos
4. Reducing to pairwise destroys insights



**THANKS!** Austin Benson  
<http://cs.cornell.edu/~arb>  
@austinbenson  
arb@cs.cornell.edu

*Higher-order homophily is combinatorially impossible.*  
Nate Veldt, Austin R. Benson, and Jon Kleinberg.  
arXiv:2103.11818, 2021.

**Code & Data.** [github.com/nveldt/HypergraphHomophily](https://github.com/nveldt/HypergraphHomophily)



Cornell University